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Abstract This paper explores the securitisation of British Muslims within a global
context in which tensions are reignited by the threat that Islamist terrorism, and Islam
more generally, are considered to pose to the West. While Western involvement in
Muslim-majority countries continues to fuel the idea of a ‘clash of civilisations’,
domestic responses to terrorism and extremism take forward its rhetoric. At the heart
of 15 years of wide-ranging responses lies the state ‘security syndrome’. Operating
through the paradigm of risk reduction, the British state has reasserted its primary role
as the distributor of security in ways that move beyond the surgical targeting of violent
Islamists and their supporters and instead risk impacting on Muslims qua Muslims.
Counter-terrorism and anti-extremism notions and practices that conflate security risks
and cultural threats signal that Great Britain is a liberal democracy that is yet to fully
foster positive inter-community relations and achieve social cohesion.
Keywords Muslims . Great Britain . Security . Counter-terrorism . 9/11 . Clash of
civilisations . Democracy
Introduction
In casting light on the nature of the ongoing securitisation of British Muslims through a
series of counter-terrorism measures that have been deployed since 9/11, it is important
to recognise the wider and deeper political, social and cultural interconnections be-
tween Great Britain, and the West more generally, and Muslims, and Islam more
generally. History and geopolitical dynamics have shaped the ideological contours of
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a West–Islam dichotomy, from the Battle of Tours in 732 AD, when Charles Martel led
a victory over the Umayyad Caliphate army and secured the defence of Europe from
external forces (Hanson 2001), up to the recent military interventions in Af-
ghanistan, Iraq and Syria as part of the Global War on Terror. In contemporary
times, the global dimension of the alleged clash of civilisations between the
Western world and the Muslim world has often translated into domestic cultural
narratives 1 of a conflict between ‘us’—the liberal British—and ‘them’—the
‘backward’ Muslims who are believed to threaten the social and cultural fabric
of Great Britain and the security of its citizens. Against this landscape, the last
three British governments have responded to, and partly fed, public perceptions
of a domestic cultural clash of civilisations. Operating through the paradigm of
risk reduction, the British state has reasserted its primary role as the distributor
of security in ways that move beyond the surgical targeting of violent Islamists2
and their supporters and instead risk impacting on Muslims qua Muslims. This
paper’s main contention is that counter-terrorism and anti-extremism notions and
practices that conflate security risks and cultural threats signal that Great Britain is
a liberal democracy that is yet to fully foster positive inter-community relations and
achieve social cohesion.
Violent actions, extreme ideas and Muslim communities: security practices
and discourses in contemporary Britain
The exacerbation of the domestic tensions between Muslims and the British state and
security apparatus has occurred through the deployment of a series of measures aimed
at countering the real and perceived risk of terrorism and, in particular, reasserting the
state’s primary function in the sphere of social order and in the distribution of security.
Terrorism is one of the four most serious threats, alongside state-based threats,
cybercrime and the erosion of the rules-based international order, expounded in the
National Security Strategy and Strategic Defence and Security Review 2015 (Home
Office 2015a). Great Britain faces an ongoing threat from Islamist terrorist groups and
individuals (MI5 2016).3 The bombings on London’s transportation system in 2005, the
bombings at Glasgow International Airport in 2007 and the murder of British soldier
Lee Rigby in Woolwich in 2013 all serve to illustrate this point. In the past year alone,
at least seven different Islamist terrorist plots were disrupted by law enforcement and
security and intelligence services (Home Office 2015a). Between 2003 and 2011, at
1 Of course, there are some countervailing narratives at play in the British cultural script, from the million-
person ‘Stop the War’ march in 2003, to Prime Minister David Cameron prefacing every statement he makes
about Islamist terrorism with the words ‘this is not about Islam’. However, with regard to this last point, one
should not be naive with regard to the fact that Cameron’s words may simply be a political stratagem, as he
knows very well that if he did say anything remotely critical of Islam he would be strongly criticised by The
Guardian, the Muslim Council of Britain and numerous other organisations that work to counter the ‘us/them’
dichotomy.
2 Violent Islamists ideologically associated with al-Qaeda and likeminded groups can also be defined ‘Salafist
jihadists’, that is people who Bcombine revolutionary Islam originating from Egypt with fundamentalist Islam
as practiced in Saudi Arabia (Salafism or Wahhabism)^ (Nesser 2015:6).
3 Readers wishing to consult a minutely detailed historical analysis of the development and formation of
Islamist terrorist circles in Great Britain should consult Raffaello Pantucci’s (2015) work.
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least eight major foiled terrorist plots4 involved would-be perpetrators who were con-
spiring to murder and/or cause explosions (Herrington 2015b). It is possible to document
close to a dozen Islamist-related terrorist incidents in the last 7 years stemming from one
English town alone, High Wycombe, including eight arrests in relation to a plot to blow
up seven transatlantic planes in 2009. In the decade after 9/11, 150 people were convicted
for Islamist-related terrorism in the United Kingdom (Vidino and Brandon 2012).
The terrorist alert is high across Europe, especially after the three Islamist terrorist
attacks that struck France twice, in Paris, and Denmark, in Copenhagen, in 2015, leaving a
total of 150 people dead and 395 people injured. The latest terrorist attack, which killed 32
people and injured 315 others in Brussels, Belgium, in March 2016, further demonstrates
that violent Islamists pose a real and serious threat to European societies. The mobilisation
of Western Muslims in support of the Islamic State in the Middle East is unprecedented in
size evenwhen compared to the historical antecedents in Afghanistan in the 1980s, Bosnia
and Chechnya in the 1990s and Afghanistan, Iraq and Somalia in the 2000s (Vidino
2015a). By late 2014, as many as 5,000 European-based fighters travelled to Syria and
Iraq to join the ranks of the Islamic State (Europol 2015). Reportedly, 800 of these fighters
travelled from the United Kingdom (Home Office 2015a).5 The decentralised structure of
the Islamic State and its capacity to trigger B‘individual jihad’ operations by unaffiliated
sympathisers in the West^ (Hegghammer and Nesser 2015:27) has alarmed security
agencies across the West and has warned experts of the need to consider the political,
diplomatic and military responses to a potential, large-scale terrorism campaign.
The British security measures that have been put in place in the past 13 years form part
of a holistic, mixed ‘high policing’6 and ‘low policing’7 approach (Bonino 2012) whose
remit and scope are set out in a counter-terrorism strategy calledCONTEST (HomeOffice
2011). CONTEST operates as a domestic, multiagency strategy: it evolved out of the
long-standing British experience of combating Irish-related terrorism during theNorthern
Ireland conflict (Gearson and Rosemont 2015) and was adapted to respond to the
increasingly serious threat posed by Islamist terrorism at the beginning of the twenty-
first century. CONTESTwas originally developed within the Home Office in 2003 and
made publicly available in 2006. It was revised in 2009 and in 2011 and is due to be
further updated in 2016 Bthrough a new National Security Council (NSC) committee on
Counter-Terrorism, chaired by the Prime Minister^ (Home Office 2015a:37). CON-
TEST’s aims are fourfold: (1) to Prevent violent extremism, (2) to Prepare the country
for a terrorist attack, (3) to Protect the country from a terrorist attack, and (d) to Pursue
terrorists. Counter-terrorism-related regulations and provisions are set out in various
pieces of legislation such as the Terrorism Act 2000, the Anti-Terrorism, Crime and
4 The code names for the police operations that disrupted these terrorist plots are: Operation Crevice (2003);
Operation Theseus (2005); Operation Vivace (2005); Operation Overt (2006); Operation Gamble (2007);
Operation Seagram (2007); Operation Pitsford (2011); and an unnamed police operation in Exeter in 2008
(Herrington 2015b).
5 In the first three quarters of 2015, in the United States around 250 fighters travelled to the Middle East to join
the Islamic State and about 900 individuals were actively investigated as Islamic State sympathisers across 50
American states. Moreover, 56 individuals were arrested in 2015 alone, a record yearly figure for terrorism-
related arrests since 2001 (Vidino and Hughes 2015).
6 For a full discussion on ‘high policing’, which is broadly defined as ‘political surveillance’, readers should
consult the work of Jean-Paul Brodeur (1983).
7 For a full discussion on ‘low policing’, which is broadly defined as ‘law enforcement’, readers can again
consult the work of Jean-Paul Brodeur (1983).
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Security Act 2001, the Prevention of Terrorism Act 2005, the Terrorism Act 2006, the
Counter-Terrorism Act 2008, the Terrorism Prevention and Investigation Measures Act
2011, the Protection of FreedomsAct 2012, the Data Retention and Investigatory Powers
Act 2014 and the Counter-Terrorism and Security Act 2015.
Several measures and legislations utilised to prevent violent extremism and combat
terrorism have received their fair share of public, academic and expert criticism: the
Prevent strategy within CONTEST (Horne and Bestvater 2016; Richards 2012); stop
and search powers that fall under Schedule 7 and the now-repealed Section 44 of the
Terrorism Act 2000; and restrictions of individuals’ movement, communication, work,
financial activities and so on in the form of ‘control orders’ (Prevention of Terrorism
Act 2005), which were repealed in 2011 in favour of lighter versions—that is,
Terrorism Prevention and Investigation Measures (TPIMs) (Fenwick 2011a, b). Liter-
ature across the critical domain in sociology, criminology and security studies has
extensively criticised the British government for the following practices: widening the
net beyond terrorist groups to target Muslim communities at large (Pantazis and
Pemberton 2009); stigmatising and alienating Muslims qua Muslims (Bartlett and
Birdwell 2010; Choudhury and Fenwick 2011) through extensive surveillance
(Thomas 2012); and, overall, fostering social cleavages (Hewitt 2008) between
‘us’—the modern, liberal British inhabiting a Bsociety ‘under attack’^ (Hickman
et al. 2011:3)—and ‘them’—the dangerous, fundamentalist Muslims.
This latter point certainly represents an analysis stretched to the extreme. However, it
shows the path that security practices, building upon both legitimate concerns for the
real and serious threat that Islamist terrorism poses to European Member States 8
(Europol 2015) and the global, political and cultural fears of Muslims, have taken in
the direction of a symbolic embodiment of a domestic cultural clash of civilisations.
The value of such an analysis also demonstrates the continuum in the recycling of
punitive and preventative measures in dealing with ‘problem populations’. This ap-
proach originated in the 1970s with the impetus in securitising Irish communities
during the Northern Ireland conflict (Hillyard 1993) and later translated into the post-
9/11 emergence of a ‘British Leviathan’. Stefano Bonino (2013:5) posits that the British
Leviathan acquires its power from Ba reinforced state sovereignty and embodies the
normalisation of a ‘state of permanent exception’ in which the securitisation mantra
penetrates the social fabrics and individual rights are superseded in favour of enhanced
state authority .^ This mantra operates within a complex social context in which British
Muslims’ process of violent radicalisation escapes definitive explanations. Instead, it
emerges as a consequence of multiple interconnected factors, ranging from ideology,
grievance and mobilisation (Pantucci 2015) to personal vulnerabilities9 and political
discontent with foreign policy (House of Commons 2012).
8 In this sense, the position that counter-terrorism measures should never endanger the Schengen system and
freedom of movement (Bigo et al. 2015b) should more realistically consider the opportunities that a borderless
Europe offers to criminals of all sorts, including terrorists, and the practical limitations of European intelli-
gence in effectively countering terrorism.
9 The experience of Morten Storm, a Danish convert to Islam who became deeply involved with al-Qaeda in
the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) and who later helped Western intelligence agencies to disrupt terrorist groups,
offers a unique case study on how personal vulnerabilities, particularly a lack of identity, a troubled family and
a history of criminality, can sometimes lead to violent radicalisation (see Bonino 2016a; Storm et al. 2014).
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The most recent measures set out in the Counter-Terrorism and Security Act 2015
are aimed at keeping up with the evolving national and international terrorist threats.
They represent a shift from prior legislation and policy, which were predominantly
aimed at the planning stages of a terrorist attack, and instead focus on the Bdisruption of
connections between radicalisation and planning attacks^ (Fenwick 2016:12). In an
attempt to deal with individuals travelling to or from the battlefields in Syria and Iraq,
the Act allows security authorities to seize at ports and borders the passports of people
intending to engage in terrorism-related activities abroad and permits the Secretary of
State to temporarily exclude suspected terrorists from the United Kingdom via a
Temporary Exclusion Order (TEO). The Act further strengthens TPIMs (Fenwick
2016). Moreover, the Act places Prevent on a statutory footing, thus devolving the
delivery of some preventative counter-terrorism functions to public authorities. Uni-
versities, schools, the health sector, prisons and local authorities now have a legal duty
to assess the threat of radicalisation among those with whom they work (for example:
students, patients, prisoners and so on) and take appropriate action. Coupled with the
problems posed by the myriad ways in which radicalisation can be defined, become
manifest and be rightly or wrongly assessed, this move is emblematic of the
securitisation of individuals beyond their direct involvement in or support for
terrorism-related activities. 10 This move links in with the proposals set out in the
recently published Counter-Extremism Strategy (Home Office 2015b), which seeks to
capture in its ‘pre-crime net’ individuals who justify violence, promote hatred and
division, encourage isolation, propound alternative systems of law, reject the demo-
cratic system and carry out harmful and illegal cultural practices.
This type of approach receives support from scholars who maintain that Bthe
difference between non-violent extremists […] and violent extremists […] is often
only one of strategy and tactics^ (Schmid 2014:18) and that, therefore, both groups
should be subject to similar measures. The now-proscribed extremist al-Muhajiroun
group for a long time managed to steer clear of directly instigating terrorist action but
had nonetheless inspired many individuals to join violent jihad and also connected
them to terrorist groups worldwide (Lowles and Mulhall 2013). Similarly, Lorenzo
Vidino (2015b) notes that, in some European countries, extremist groups such as Hizb
ut-Tahrir have moved from non-violent confrontation to violent militancy, thus dem-
onstrating operational dynamics that are mutable and can allow the strategic embrace-
ment of violence at some point in the life cycle of an extremist group.
But while ‘hearts and minds’ approaches to curbing extremist, pro-violence views
remain a sensible option (Murray et al. 2015), the targeting of both actions and ideas with
the same security weapons continues to be controversial (Gearson and Rosemont 2015)
and needs to be well balanced to become workable. The risk is to endanger the strategic
implementation, effectiveness and credibility of preventative measures. Reducing the
10 The criminalisation of members of the Kurdish diaspora in London who are not involved in preparing acts
of violence and are not members of the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) is a case in point. It demonstrates not
only the construction of a ‘moderate’ versus ‘extremist’ Muslim narrative in the counter-terrorism world
(Sentas 2015) but also shows that the criminalisation of illegal activities, such as financially and/or politically
supporting the PKK, can extend to less (il)legally clear-cut situations, such as attending Kurdish community
centres that authorities interpret as Binstrumental extensions of the PKK because of their political work^
(Sentas 2015:9).
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threat of terrorism requires community cooperation: overcoming distrust while generat-
ing trust (Cherney and Hartley 2015) is key in successfully enticing communities to
participate in the local delivery of security. In this sense, Bthe logics and aims of Prevent
have [often] been highly problematic in terms of [both] their positioning of Muslims as a
security risk and poorly integrated into British society and the limited, and limiting, offers
of engagement that have characterised participatory initiatives conducted under Prevent^
(O’Toole et al. 2015:165). Perceived net-widening measures that target both violent
actions and extreme views could leave some Muslim partners unwilling to collaborate
and engage in participatory initiatives, as has happened withPrevent so far (O’Toole et al.
2015). Problematically, catch-all security tendencies embody a domestically emanated
clash of civilisations, whereby the symbolic values of diversity shape visible, ossified
boundaries between those who are considered to be the likely perpetrators of terrorism
and those who are considered to be the defenders of the public good.
It is also unclear whether implementing measures that capture a whole range of
extreme ideas will prevent a minority of Muslims from inspiring, supporting, planning
and/or directly engaging in violent action. Wide-ranging measures could backfire and
drive terrorist ideologues and their supporters further underground, eventually making
security efforts all the more reliant on activities of intelligence gathering. It is crucial
that the disruption of future terrorist plans does not become restricted to the difficult
penetration of clandestine groups. If British policing history teaches anything, it is that
infiltrating domestic extremist groups poses a myriad of operational challenges (Bonino
and Kaoullas 2015) that are particularly magnified when penetrating extremist Islamist
groups. The increasing threat posed by both lone actors (Alfaro-Gonzalez et al. 2015)
and small cells lacking links to established terrorist networks (Europol 2015) as part of
a ‘decentralised jihad’ (see Nesser 2015) demonstrates that terrorism manifests itself as
a multifarious phenomenon that needs to be tackled through a range of diverse, flexible
and targeted measures.
While critics of the British approach to the threat of terrorism have lamented the
value-oriented nature of post-9/11 security measures (see, for example, Thomas 2012),
they have concentrated their analysis on the level of what is (ineffective, discriminatory,
unethical and so on) and what ought to be (less impactful, more participatory, better
aware of Muslim grievances and so on), especially as seen from a human rights
perspective. Nevertheless, further research is required to fully understand the rationale
and the meanings of pervasive security responses in the aftermath of 9/11 and the
pragmatic feasibility of the proposed ought to be alternatives from the point of view of
the state as a realpolitik actor that Bpursues self-interest, [often] in violation of laws and
norms [which it itself establishes through its political institutions]^ (Tocci 2009:126).
Arguably, the illegality 11 of extensive stop-and-searches under the now-repealed
Section 44 of the Terrorism Act 2000 and their alleged ineffectiveness in providing
intelligence on terrorism plots and achieving prosecutions of individuals for terrorism-
related offences (Human Rights Watch 2010) make it hard to justify them on either a
pragmatic or a moral basis. Notably, these measures fail to conform to those best
11 As per the ruling of the European Court of Human Rights, which deemed the powers of Section 44 not to
safeguard against abuses and not to be sufficiently circumscribed.
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counter-terrorism practices that Bare achieved by patient, professional police work,
carried out within the framework of normal, inherited, democratic legal processes^
(English 2015:24).
The state has a range of choices at its disposal when confronting the risk that
terrorism poses to national security. As Adam Roberts (2005) maintains, the American
and British governments responded to 9/11 by basing their War on Terror foreign policy
on open confrontation. This is a position attested by the National Security Strategy for
the United States (The White House 2002) and the United Kingdom’s Strategic
Defence Review: A New Chapter (Ministry of Defence 2002), two documents that
converge in considering attack as the best defence. Instead, Roberts posits that a
different set of measures would provide better results in the fight against international
terrorism—that is, weakening political and governmental support for terrorist groups;
tackling the various grievances that terrorists exploit to foster support; promoting
democratic processes; and incentivising negotiation and tacit settlements. Other
scholars, such as Lucia Zedner (2008), suggest reducing the vast array of intrusive
emergency measures adopted to fight terrorism by introducing strict requirements that
must be fulfilled prior to exceptional state action, such as a real, imminent and grave
threat; firm evidence against one or more individuals; and the absence of less intrusive,
more efficient, alternative measures.
Yet, to be effective these proposals need to transcend the realm of the idealistic and
become pragmatically and politically applicable. It is not only our political culture,
which favours overreaction over under-reaction (Ignatieff 2004), that is responsible for
many of the heavy-handed state responses to the real and perceived risk of terrorism.
As the security state has replaced the welfare state and has promoted the hollowing out
of civil rights through never-ending wars against terrorism, crime, antisocial behaviour
and illegal immigration (Hallsworth and Lea 2011), it is also the very nature of such a
risk that de facto ties the state, which often places national security above individual
liberties, to those responses. Given that the double-infinite risk of terrorism is coloured
by both uncertainty and (potential) catastrophe, Bthe rationality of catastrophic risk
translates into policies that actively seek to prevent situations from becoming cata-
strophic at some indefinite point in the future^ (Aradau and Van Munster 2007:105;
emphasis in the original). The sociopolitical disposition that appears to value the
common good over individual liberties distorts the necessity of security Bas one of
the most basic, defining functions of the polity^ (Loader and Walker 2007:97) and
instead reacts to a risk which Ulrich Beck (1992) would define as being unpredictable
due to its statistically unlikely and non-recurring nature. In this respect, CONTESTwas
born out the application of a risk management and reduction approach to countering
terrorism (Gearson and Rosemont 2015). But recent research has demonstrated that,
while terrorism predictions can work on a global scale, they do not manage Bto assess
the risk to specific cities or companies, or the absolute magnitude of attacks^
(Schiermeier 2015:420), thus making preventative measures very hard to correctly
engineer and direct towards specific targets. The undesired impact of these security
measures on large Muslim communities therefore results not only from short-sighted
strategies but also from both the existing limitations of future-oriented models of risk
reduction and political orientations that seek to actively demonstrate a commitment to
majority interests and public expectations of security over minority demands for
equality and recognition.
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When extending our gaze beyond security to unearth the core of the project of
democratic polities, Danielle Allen’s reminder that Bthe central feature of democratic
politics is […] its commitment to preserving the allegiance of all citizens, including
electoral minorities, despite majority rule^ (Allen 2006:xix; emphasis in the original) is
morally and ethically impeccable, yet often politically unworkable. Great Britain
exemplifies the Western difficulties in keeping faith with the promise of a truly
egalitarian and democratic politics in which state behaviour aims to achieve the
maximisation of collective welfare. The egalitarian ‘unfinished project’ finds compel-
ling evidence in the perpetuation of socio-economic inequalities across the world
(European Commission 2010) and, in particular, in the record held by the United
Kingdom as the only country in the Group of 7 to have experienced a rise in wealth
inequality over the whole of the period 2000–2014 (Credit Suisse 2014).
A country with a long-standing tradition of being home to various religious
movements and of offering asylum to fundamentalist Islamist preachers fleeing
repressive, foreign societies (Hellyer 2007), Great Britain has also been lambasted
for perpetuating too lax a liberalism and too stretched a Western multiculturalism
(Leiken 2005), thus bequeathing ethno-cultural tensions to its future generations.
Undoubtedly, a particular political philosophy can increase or reduce state gover-
nance, autonomy and power. In this respect, liberal democracy may have emerged
as what Fukuyama would define as ‘the ultimate Western ideology’, only chal-
lenged by the lesser adversaries represented by nationalism and religious funda-
mentalism (Fukuyama 1989). Nevertheless, no contemporary Western political
philosophies or forms of government (whether continental European dirigism or
Anglo-Saxon localism) escape the strict boundaries of state political monopoly in
both the distribution of security and the process of delimiting the perimeters of
cultural belonging to society.
The British multicultural, pluralistic state normatively differs from, for example, the
French Republican laical and secular state based on ideological sameness. While Great
Britain champions equality on the basis of equal opportunities, France forges it through
institutions, for example schools, where a visible identity is enforced, such as Ba
national identity which aims to detach individuals from their particular community of
group and to assimilate them to the vast collective community which is the French
nation^ (Freedman 2004:10–11). Nonetheless, while the foulard affair in 1989 and the
subsequent banning of Islamic symbols from public spaces pushed France to fight any
visible threat to its sociopolitical and cultural stability (Freedman 2004), in the same
year the Rushdie Affair highlighted a fracture between notions and practices of
multiculturalism, insofar as ethno-cultural and religious differences signalled the exis-
tence of tensions between (so-called) British and (so-called) Muslim understandings of
belonging to, and coexistence within, society. Whether the context is that of second-
class ‘French’ immigrants or ‘enemies within’ a British context coloured by shifting
attitudes towards its Muslim population (Hudson 2007), visible diversity and out-
groupness have made the symbolic clash of civilisations a lived reality for liberal
societies across many Western countries. Since 9/11 the state has visibly reasserted its
role as the primary distributor of security that prepares and directs counter-terrorism
policies and practices that often, intentionally or unintentionally, focus on Muslims qua
Muslims rather than specifically targeting individuals engaged in or supporting violent
jihad.
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The state ‘security syndrome’ and the challenges of liberal democracy
The main element that critics of state responses to the threat of terrorism tend to gloss
over is that the goal, even if not the effectiveness, of such responses might make sense
when looked at from the point of view of the state as a realpolitik actor affected by a
post-9/11 ‘security syndrome’. Arguably, the state’s point of view may not necessarily,
and often does not, match the aspirations of all individuals and groups that are governed
within the boundaries of the polity. However, it highlights the predominance of the state
in shaping ideas of security and in distributing the services of policing. State is here
understood in a loosely Weberian fashion (Weber 1946 [1919]) as an entity that (a)
operates through a centralised government—or a political society made up of a central
bureaucracy, the police and the military (Gramsci 1971 [1947])—which (b) governs a
clearly delimited geographical territory, (c) upon which it exerts political and legal
powers, (d) in particular by holding monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force,
(e) through which it exerts domination. It would certainly be simplistic to consider the
modern state as a monolithic entity. Instead, it includes a complex vortex of agencies
and institutions with connections to business, charities and civil society. Further-
more, while the state is the predominant, yet not the monopolistic, provider of
security, there exist a multitude of actors and agencies, such as private security
and civil society, which are also involved in the process of securitisation (Loader
and Walker 2007).
The modus operandi of the British counter-terrorism apparatus itself relies upon a
multiagency delivery of security between central government, local government, police
forces, charities and other publicly funded bodies. This model is behind the Prevent
strategy and initiatives originating within Prevent, such as ‘Channel’, an early-
intervention programme that aims to Bidentify and provide support to individuals
who are at risk of being drawn into terrorism^ (Home Office 2015c:3). This multi-
agency approach has not been unproblematic. Recent research (O’Toole et al. 2015) has
highlighted both ongoing tensions among the Home Office (Office for Security and
Counter-Terrorism), the Department for Communities and Local Government and the
Foreign and Commonwealth Office, driven by their different logics and practices of
working with Muslim communities under Prevent, and the reluctance of local author-
ities12 13 to engage in such a strategy (see also Alam and Husband 2013). But, despite
the existence of a networked plurality of security providers in the realm of counter-
terrorism and the fact that within Europe alone there are fundamental differences
12 This became very apparent during a community cohesion event organised in a city within the Yorkshire and
Humber region in July 2015. Both the organiser of the event and a City Council representative informed
Stefano Bonino of the importance of leaving any ‘Prevent’ and/or ‘extremism’-related language out of the
speech that he was scheduled to deliver to leaders of the Muslim community, teachers, members of the armed
forces and other parties.
13 Several academics have also openly resisted the implementation of Prevent in universities (The Independent
2015; The Guardian 2016). However, a minority of academic voices (Farrar 2015; Times Higher Education
2016) have expressed concerns at the fact that some scholars associate with, or give an unchallenged platform
to, reactionary Islamists who openly sympathise with violent jihad. Official claims about al-Qaeda’s secret
recruitment in British universities and colleges dates at least as far back as 2005 and are contained in a joint
Home Office and Foreign Office report entitled ‘Young Muslims and Extremism’ (Hoffman 2014).
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between the aspirations and operations of states vis-à-vis security, 14 the post-9/11
climate has witnessed the emergence of a ‘security syndrome’ in the form of
A certain clawing back by the state of pluralized security authority in favour of a
reassertion of the importance of ‘old’ state agencies (the police, intelligence
services, military) as well as the formation of ‘new’ ones such as the Department
of Homeland Security in the USA and the Serious and Organized Crime Agency
[later replaced by the National Crime Agency] in the UK. (Loader and Walker
2007:199)
Moreover, the fragmentations and complexities of state-related or associated agen-
cies in governing and securing society still do not turn the state into such a heteroge-
neous, fuzzy entity that its conceptual totality becomes indiscernible. While the
securitisation of Muslims is also carried out by non-state actors ranging from private
security officers to public sector professionals with a duty of care (Blackwood et al.
2012), even more so following the Counter-Terrorism and Security Act 2015, the
legitimacy of such actors’ actions is provided by top-down state-directed legislation,
policies and political deliberations. In other words, non-state security actors and local
agencies do not exist in a vacuum but are informed, if not encouraged, by state and
political orientations towards order and security, especially in the post-9/11 empower-
ment of governments and security institutions that have devised national strategies such
as CONTEST, have funded some organisations (for example, the Radical Middle Way)
rather than others (for example, the Muslim Council of Britain) and have steered local
engagement with vulnerable communities in the directions set out in Prevent. Lastly,
the process of moving away from, and devolving some of, its ‘rowing’ functions
(delivering the services of policing and security) in favour of stronger ‘steering’
functions (legitimising, regulating and distributing the services of policing and security)
(Osborne and Gaebler 1992) has made the state Bmore active—demanding a greater
degree of the very authority and legitimacy that the move towards multi-actor gover-
nance threatens to undermine^ (Loader and Walker 2007:121).
The counter-terrorism measures which have been rolled out in Great Britain take
place in a Western political context in which scholars have for the past few decades
noticed the emergence of a penal state (Wacquant 2009) that shapes a disciplinary
society (Foucault 1977) grounded on a pervasive culture of control (Garland 2001);
elevates crime to everyday fear; promotes ontological insecurity (Giddens 1991); and
erodes social trust (Simon 2007). Conceptually, by being the focus of policing mea-
sures and by sharing the same faith with a tiny number of violent Islamists, some
Muslims have become the trademark of negatively perceived diversity, whose rights
risk being trumped in the name of an all-pervading security mantra and whose
14 At the institutional level, one may note the centralised and militaristic system of policing (French
Gendarmerie Nationale, Italian Arma dei Carabinieri, SpanishGuardia Civil and so on) typical of continental
European countries versus the British orientation towards localism (territorial police forces). So far as specific
European approaches to countering radicalisation are concerned, Vidino and Brandon (2012) highlight the
cultural, political and legal peculiarities that inform the different strategies that have been rolled out in the
United Kingdom, the Netherlands, Denmark and Norway.
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marginalisation can allay the anxieties of the broader population and, in turn, sustain
the ‘state of security’.
Some counter-terrorism measures have failed to surgically target terrorists and their
supporters and, instead, have focused their attention on individuals far and wide. This is
nowhere more evident than in Great Britain where Bbetween 2001 and 2010 there were
1,834 terrorism-related arrests […], from which 404 people were charged, 332 prose-
cuted and 237 convicted of terrorism-related offences^ (Choudhury 2012:30). The fact
that 13 % of those arrested for terrorism-related offences were eventually convicted for
such offences demonstrates that the national security impetus is not entirely misplaced.
At the same time, it demonstrates that the same impetus has problematically endan-
gered the civil liberties of 87 % of people arrested, who were later found not to be
guilty of terrorism-related offences. Evidence from quantitative studies shows that,
particularly in the first few years after September 2001, offenders motivated by Islamist
ideologies received significantly longer sentences than those motivated by other ideol-
ogies (Amirault and Bouchard 2015). Ultimately, the increased security focus on a
whole religious community and the erosion of civil liberties becomes not only a
political and moral issue but also poses a wider social and cultural risk. Research
demonstrates that public acceptance of civil liberties’ reduction is strictly confined to a
clear transnational terrorist threat and to a perception that related policies will prevent
future acts of terrorism. Conversely, domestic terrorism threats and policies designed to
counter such a threat are much less likely to gain public support (Garcia and Geva
2016). The intermingling of political discourses and counter-terrorism law, policy and
practice creates a powerful mix that can both encourage hostility and hatred towards
Muslims (Mythen et al. 2009; Poynting and Mason 2006; Pantazis and Pemberton
2009) and endanger the cooperation of communities in the local delivery of security
measures. This speaks not just of the British state as a security actor but also of the
capacity of Western democracy to cater for, and effectively deal with, its increasingly
ethno-culturally and religiously diverse population.15
Democracy—the cradle of Western fairness and egalitarianism, and often opposed to
the theocratic authoritarianism of part of the Muslim world—is often premised upon,
and ritualised through, the necessity of sacrifice and the inevitability of extreme loss.
This is skilfully spelled out in Allen’s (2006) masterpiece Talking to Strangers:
Anxieties of Citizenship Since Brown v. Board of Education:
Democracies are supposed to rest on consent and open access to happiness for
their citizens. In the dreamscape of democracy, for example à la Rousseau, every
citizen consents to every policy with glad enthusiasm. No one ever leaves the
public arena at odds with the communal choice, no one must accept political loss
or suffer the imposition of laws [to] which she has not consented. But that is a
dream. […] Since democracy claims to secure the good of all citizens, those
15 Ethnic diversity is not a national ‘necessity’. Rather, it is a political, institutional and social choice as well as
the outcome of cultural and economic processes of globalisation. There still exist economic powers and strong
liberal democracies that are ethno-racially homogeneous, for example Japan (about 98.5 % ethnic Japanese)
and South Korea (also known asDan-il minjok guk ga, or ‘the single race society’, which has over 99 % ethnic
South Koreans).
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people who benefit less than others from particular political decisions, but
nonetheless accede to those decisions, preserve the stability of political institu-
tions. Their sacrifice makes collective democratic action possible. […] The hard
truth of democracy is that some citizens are always giving things up for others
(Allen 2006:28–29).
The founding principles underpinning Western democracies vary and have spurred
much debate. The very fact that democracy binds together federations, confederations
and international regimes is part of a universalising state phase that has replaced the
politics of empires (Huntington 1996), thus shifting our understanding of political life.
While the United States is grounded on equality, liberty, individualism, populism,
laissez-faire and, more generally, an Anglo-Protestant culture of ethnic traditions,
European states tend to foster national identities based on blood and soil (Fukuyama
1989). Although Francis Fukuyama rightly notices that a problem inherent in group
rights in liberal democracies is that not every group necessarily upholds liberal values
and that equality should be granted to individuals qua individuals and not as members
of cultural communities, he fails to account for the higher communal order represented
by the state.
Such an order has faced difficulties in reconciling national security with civil
liberties, as demonstrated by the securitisation of Muslims (as a sociocultural group)
in the process of reducing the risk posed by Islamist terrorism. In this sense, the call to
Bremain vigilant, not just about the terrorist risk, but also about forms of control which
unjustly vilify and criminalize law-abiding communities^ (Mythen and Walklate
2006:395) reminds scholars of the perils of uncritically accepting the goodness of
liberal democratic state action. Moreover, the securitisation of Muslim communities can
undermine equal participation in what are already unequal social and political spheres.
Arguably, inequalities are not a novelty of the twenty-first century. As history teaches,
at no point since the mid-seventeenth-century’s spread of the Westphalian system of
sovereignty and the nineteenth-century’s flourishing of nation states, and much less so
in the previous geopolitical arrangements of empires and smaller states, has a society
fulfilled its egalitarian dream. To remain closer to the recent past, in the twentieth
century no major nation state is known to have existed that did not encompass profound
social differences and inequalities. Italy in the early 1900s, the United Kingdom
(technically a multinational state) throughout the two World Wars, France in the post-
war period, Japan in the 1960s, Germany in the 1990s and any other European country
during the Long Peace (from 1945 until today) have all been fragmented and had
exclusionary polities. Despite living in one of the most peaceful eras in the history of
humankind and despite an ongoing global process characterised by political
democratisation, the spread of civil rights, the reduction of inequalities and increased
access to education (Pinker 2011), modern states are still far from treating all of their
citizens equally.
On the one hand, this follows a historical continuum that has arrived at the
sanctification of the state at the expense of local social aggregates. Robert Putnam
famously explored the ongoing atomisation of society and the decline in social capital
(bonding social capital plus bridging social capital). As social networks between
homogeneous groups (bonding social capital) have weakened, Putnam (2000) main-
tains, similar networks between heterogeneous groups (bridging social capital) have
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withered away too, resulting in tensions among ethnic communities. At the local level
‘skirmishes’ amongst civilisations can only find fertile ground. Paradoxically, instead
of curing the illnesses of intermediate forms of association (family, neighbourhood,
trade unions, churches, et cetera), people have fulfilled their social need for community
by building totalising entities, namely states, which concentrate power within central
governments (Nisbet 1953). The ‘security syndrome’ affecting the British state ap-
proaches the reduction of risks at the macro level of national law and order, thus
highlighting Bthe fact that the policy response to risk, danger, threat and uncertainty is
primarily based on the resurgence of sovereign and authoritarian forms of rule^
(Campbell 2011:161–162). The suspension of legal determinations, such as the dis-
tinction between the public and the private spheres, brought about by the juridical void
of a B‘state of exception’ […which] appears as a threshold of indeterminacy between
democracy and absolutism^, (Agamben 2005:3) compels further caution concerning
the absolute empowerment of the state in conceptualising and directing security.
Moreover, the fact that extra security measures create a culture of suspicion that
endangers trust and social cohesion (Herbert 2012) poses important questions about
the trade-off between security, on the one side, and community relations and individual
liberties, on the other side.
On the other hand, the socio-demographic situation of minorities and the political
fragmentation16 of Muslims in Great Britain place diversity in an unequal relationship
with community cohesion. Great Britain lacks the cultural mix of Northern Ireland,
which is composed of Blongstanding and now approximately equally-sized
communities^ (Herbert 2012:357). In lacking such a distinctiveness and being, instead,
Ba product of rapid immigration creating a multicultural, multi—religious society
within a couple of generations^ (Herbert 2012:357), Great Britain is still coming to
terms with its ethno-cultural fragmentations. Such fragmentations have been publicly
reasserted both by illiberal actions epitomised in the burning of Salman Rushdie’s
Satanic Verses in Bradford in 1989 and in the post-9/11 social process of constructing a
Muslim Other. The idea of nation as a moral conscience based on collective solidarity
and imagined common history (Renan 1939) and as an intersubjective reality existing
in collective imaginations yet playing a key role in binding people together (Harari
2014) is all the more powerful when deployed through the political symbols of an
attack on British values. The British government wisely considers fundamental values
to be democracy, the rule of law, individual liberty and tolerance of different beliefs and
faiths (Home Office 2015b). Consequently, extremism is the vocal or active opposition
of such values. Extremism, the British government suggests, Bdivides communities and
weakens the social fabric of our country^ (Home Office 2015a:37) and warrants
cultural self-defence (Cameron 2011). But readers should not forget that extremism
16 The Muslim Council of Britain (MCB) was set up in 1997 to act as an umbrella institution including around
400 organisations, mosques and schools, to give voice to Muslim communities. Yet, the MCB was mainly
grounded in ideologies springing from the Middle Eastern and South Asian anti-colonial political Islam and
was particularly resented by traditional, conservative and apolitical Muslim groups that did not affiliate to it.
Furthermore, as Archer (2009) shows, in a poll conducted in 2007 only 6 % of Muslims felt represented by the
MCB. Following 2001, the British government started to find new ways to govern its Muslims and distanced
itself from the MCB, in a context in which, Modood and Salt (2011) argue, integration, citizenship and group
identity formation became a prime political concern, especially after 7/7.
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partly emerged as a by-product of British state policies of tolerance towards funda-
mentalist preachers who arrived in the country in the 1980s and 1990s, who established
a foothold in London (Nesser 2015) and who encouraged Bfollowers to adopt extreme
political narratives and pursue activities designed to support the global fundamentalist
struggle^ (Herrington 2015a:15). An informal agreement (Clarke 2005) was
established between security authorities and fundamentalist preachers such as Omar
Bakri Muhammad, Abu Hamza al-Masri and Abu Qatada al-Filistini: extreme views,
including open support for violent jihad, were tolerated so long as British streets were
to be left free of blood. This controversial, informal agreement was put to the test on 7
July 2005, when four Islamist terrorists attacked the London transportation system,
killing 52 people and injuring more than 700. On that day, long-standing concerns
French,17 American and other non-British authorities had had that Great Britain had
been naively breeding its own terrorists proved to have been not entirely misplaced.
However, ‘extremism’ is not a watertight category. The scales of extremism are
manifold and political responses must be tailored around indicators of a security threat to
society. This exercise is certainly fraught with political and social complexities and
ambiguities. Lorenzo Vidino’s (2010) detailed analysis of the genesis and evolution of
the Muslim Brotherhood in the West demonstrates that clearly assessing the stances of
people bound by a political ideology (Islamism), rather than membership, a constitution
and a common strategic direction, is very difficult. While optimists find the ‘Brothers’ to
be democratic Islamists who can be a useful tool in countering violent jihadi propagan-
da, pessimists believe that they both hide a more sinister goal to gradually impose Islam
on Western societies and maintain ambivalent stances toward violence, as expounded
during private meetings and in the writings of its intellectual leader Yusuf al-Qaradawi
(Vidino 2010). Donald Holbrook (2014) masterfully elucidates these tensions when he
compares democratic Islamists, such as members of the Muslim Brotherhood, to social
democrats and Islamist militants, such as members of al-Qaeda, to communist revolu-
tionaries. Holbrook (2014:27) posits that Bthere are some vague similarities in terms of
worldviews and perceptions but stark differences in terms of methods and direction^.
Social and political suspicions toward democratic Islamists can therefore be considered
a risk-averse stance toward groups whose long-term trajectory is hard to predict.
This paper contends that limiting the freedoms of individuals who openly and
consistently sympathise with a violent jihadi group, even when falling short of involve-
ment in and/or direct support of terrorism, is justifiable in the interests of the public
17 In a rarely available insight (Hassaïne and Barling 2014) into the machinations of the intelligence apparatus,
Réda Hassaïne, an informer for the British, French and Algerian security services who infiltrated Finsbury
Park Mosque in London, recounted that, in the late 1990s, the French government grew extremely concerned
about the hands-off approach taken by British authorities toward fundamentalist preachers in London. Amid
worries that the Armed Islamic Group (GIA) could strike in France during the football World Cup 1998, the
head of the Direction Générale de la Sécurité Extérieure (DGSE) in London, codenamed ‘Jerome’, devised
two outlandish plans to deal with Abu Hamza al-Masri, the Egyptian imam of Finsbury Park Mosque and a
supporter of both the GIA and al-Qaeda. ‘Jerome’ planned to have Abu Hamza al-Masri assassinated and to
later blame his death on British far-right groups. Alternatively, he proposed to kidnap and bundle Abu Hamza
al-Masri into a van and take him to France via the Eurotunnel so that he could be prosecuted there. Neither of
the two plans became operational and Abu Hamza al-Masri continued to preach until he was arrested in 2004.
He was later extradited to the United States in 2012, convicted of terrorism charges in 2014 and sentenced to
life imprisonment in 2015 (Chon 2015).
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good. Nonetheless, in free societies based upon the rule of law and the protection of
freedoms of expression, placing legal restrictions on other extreme stances that run
counter to both the views of the majority and the established democratic order but that
fall short of involvement in and/or direct support for terrorist and/or subversive
activities is very difficult. For instance, the utopian idea of living in a Caliphate rather
than the actual practice of attempting, or encouraging others, to establish one remains in
the realm of abstract, rather than actionable, belief. The fact that around 60 % of
terrorists are involved in other criminal activities 18 (Intelligence and Security
Committee 2009) demonstrates that past actions, rather than ideas alone, can sometimes
be better indicators of future potential involvement in terrorism. Extremists holding
non-actionable beliefs could well be mobilised for targeted, short-term and last resort
activities of police-Muslim partnership within hard-to-reach communities, where street
credibility counts more than professional qualifications. Police engagement with non-
violent fundamentalists, in particular Salafis, managed to steer violent fundamentalists
away from terrorist action in London (Lambert 2008, 2011). By carefully drawing the
boundaries of extremism around politically pragmatic and socially more acceptable
contours, governments can avoid the risk that net-widening counter-terrorism measures
will fuel the rhetoric of an inevitable domestic cultural clash of civilisations. Such a
clash is often energised by confusing Muslim diversity, for example the more socially
conservative attitudes displayed by British Muslims compared to non-Muslim Britons
(Lewis and Kashyap 2013), and Muslims’ perceived threat both to ethnically and
racially fixed notions of English nationhood19 (Fenton and Mann 2011) with a threat
to public security.
Recent estimates that about 15 % of British Muslims consider suicide bombings to
be sometimes justified (Tausch 2015) 20 warrant a critical reading. Meer (2014a)
reminds us of the need to exert much caution when interpreting polls that, in the past
decade, have suggested tacit support for terrorism among a variably larger or smaller
section of the British Muslim community. The threat posed by violent Islamists and
their supporters has also played into the hands of wider sociocultural insecurities and
worries about an ‘Islamisation of Europe’ (Caldwell 2009; Fallaci 2004). Within this
context, the post-9/11 security climate demonstrates Turner’s liberal paradox—that is,
the state meddling in Bthe management of religions in the interests of civil harmony^
(Turner 2012:1060), despite its commitment to regard religion as an issue of private
conscience—and highlights a further hurdle in dealing with interwoven issues of
religion, culture and security.
The adoption of net-widening approaches that impact on Muslim communities at
large have achieved political consensus in the drafting of legislation and the deploy-
ment of measures that have not differed considerably with different governing parties
(Labour between 1997 and 2007, Conservative/Coalition between 2010 and 2015 and
Conservative since 2015), other than the institutional move of responsibility for
18 Petter Nesser’s (2015:10) detailed study of Islamist terrorism in Europe also found that Bit was not
uncommon for jihadis in Europe to have criminal records^.
19 For an assessment of the peculiar Scottish engagement with Muslim diversity, see the work of Stefano
Bonino (2015a, b, 2016c).
20 The same study estimates that, on average, about 17 % of Muslims worldwide openly express sympathies
for groups such as al-Qaeda, the Taliban, Hezbollah and Hamas (Tausch 2015).
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addressing extremism from the Department for Communities and Local Government
(under the Labour government), which worked through a wider social cohesion agenda,
to the Home Office (under the Conservative/Coalition government), which took a more
security-oriented approach. The ethos of British counter-terrorism measures itself has
also remained largely unchanged, save for minor practical alterations (for example,
control orders being transformed into TPIMs), additional powers introduced by the
Counter-Terrorism and Security Act 2015 and legislative changes (for example, the
scrapping of Section 44 of the Terrorism Act 2000) driven more by European legal
pressures than out of an institutional willingness to rectify mistakes.
Similarly, in the United States, the Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing
Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act of 2001 (also
known as the Patriot Act) was signed into law by Republican president George Bush in
October 2001 and then partially extended by Democratic president Barack Obama
10 years later, in a political context that has progressed, yet has not brought major
changes to national attitudes and foreign policies focusing on the threat of terrorism.
Despite variations in the present and past delivery of counter-terrorism, the involvement
of non-state actors and the blurring of security and community cohesion policies
(O’Toole et al. 2015), there remains a political continuum across Western liberal
democracies in the distribution of security through a state-directed approach that
elevates the fight against terrorism to a top national priority but fails to properly address
three key interconnected issues: respecting civil liberties, maintaining community
relations and fostering social cohesion. Notably, it is a contention of this paper that
counter-terrorism measures have signalled an increasing political and cultural distance
between the British state and Muslim communities, which symbolically transposes
Huntington’s clash of civilisations to within the national boundaries of the polity.
Beyond Huntington: from global clashes to national tensions
Tensions between Great Britain and Muslim communities are once again close to
breaking point, 27 years after the Rushdie Affair, 15 years after the English riots in
2001 and September 11 and 11 years after the London bombings, while the often
stereotyped, yet very complex, relationship between the West and the world of Islam(s)
is once again balancing on a thin wire. While the Islamic State continues to bring
destruction in the Middle East and heightens fears in Europe and North America,
counter-terrorismmeasures recently proposed in Europe (Bigo et al. 2015a, b) and rolled
out in Great Britain to deal with the evolving global threat posed by Islamist terrorism re-
energise the evergreen debate around the Huntingtonian clash of civilisations.
Controversial, widely disputed and yet highly popular, Huntington’s concept of the
clash of civilisations (Huntington 1993) is the most prominent recent theory that has
seriously questioned the possibility of integration and dialogue between Islam and the
Western world. Influenced by the civilisational approaches to history proposed by
Spengler (1927) and Toynbee (1974 [1934/1939]), as well as by Lewis’s (1990) first
coinage and exploration of a supposed post-Cold-War clash of civilisations and cultural
struggle between the West and Islam, Huntington’s theory foresaw conflicts and
tensions between the Western world and the Muslim world. According to Huntington,
these two worlds would clash militarily due to inherent cultural and religious
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differences and the realities of the modern political and economic systems. The
relevance of Huntington’s theory to current discourses on the relationship between
Islam and the West, including the post-9/11 Western securitisation of Muslims, is
unquestioned. It is one of the most commented-on political theories of the last 25 years
and has fuelled endless debates.
Its detractors have considered it a modern form of Orientalism—that is, an approach
that implies a Western positional superiority operating as Ba style of thought based upon
an ontological and epistemological distinction made between ‘the Orient’ and (most of
the time) ‘the Occident’^ (Said 2003 [1978]:2). Detractors have also attempted to
demolish it on various grounds. Empirically, Russett et al. (2000) demonstrate that
conflicts tend to happen primarily within the Muslim world rather than between
Western and Muslim countries (see also Fox 2001; Henderson and Tucker 2001).
The current conflict in Syria and Iraq is a case in point. Philosophically, Ali Mazrui
(2001) argues that the two worlds feed each other in a relationship of mutual cultural
and demographic interdependence. Normatively, Fouad Ajami (1993) suggests that
states act upon self-interest and are not a direct emanation of civilisation-based
identities. On the other side of the spectrum, a few scholars have provided arguments
directly or indirectly in support of Huntington’s theory. Hans Magnus Enzensberger
(2006) forcefully condemns Arab countries for lacking political freedoms, failing to
meet democratic standards, boasting high levels of corruption, being economically
underdeveloped, overlooking education and knowledge and discriminating against
women. Norris and Inglehart (2003) posit that the Western world and the Muslim
world clash over eros—that is, the lack of recognition of self-expression values in
Muslim-majority countries, namely gender equality and sexual liberation.
Nasar Meer (2014b) presents a more nuanced picture of Islamic–Western relations
when he maintains that historical colonial dynamics still inform contemporary postco-
lonial environments and notes that European civilisation has historically struggled to
incorporate difference into its conceptualisation of common life. Global surveys pro-
vide further evidence of the complex and heterogeneous relationship between West-
erners and Muslims (Pew Global Attitudes Project 2006, 2011), which escapes any
black-and-white characterisation. Attitudes towards Muslims vary greatly across Euro-
pean countries, where populations in Spain (52 %), Germany (69 %), the United
Kingdom (72 %) and France (76 %) hold much more favourable views of Muslims
compared to people in Poland (30 %) and Italy (31 %) (Pew Global Attitudes Project
2015).
This speaks of an imperfect European project of ‘cultural conversation’, whereby
what Coles (2009) identifies as converging Islamic and Western values are yet to be
fully recognised by diverse national constituencies. Moreover, this imperfect European
project highlights ongoing difficulties in implementing a neutral state, or a moderate
secular state (Modood 2010), which has emerged since the mid-1970s within circles of
European political philosophers, is broadly connected with the thoughts of John Stuart
Mill, Immanuel Kant and John Locke and is supposedly open to the accommodation of
different religions (Madeley 2003). Ongoing cultural frictions in Great Britain over
sharia law courts (Zee 2016) and forced marriage (Bonino 2016b) also suggest that the
more conservative sections of the Muslim community still struggle to adapt to existing
legal frameworks and social norms, thus placing Muslim diversity in a weak position
when it seeks to negotiate group-based demands in the contested arenas of security.
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Serious global tensions between the Western world and the Muslim world are
probably better defined in terms of hostilities between either a specific set of nation
states or Western nation states and violent Islamist/jihadist groups. The United States,
often with support from its British ally, has been particularly active in responding to
much of the provocation received from Middle Eastern, Asian and Arab Muslim states
and/or groups by waging wars (for example, Afghanistan and Iraq) and taking military
measures (for example, Pakistan) to curb terrorism-related hostilities between the
Western world and the Muslim world, and by offering political and/or military support
to various conflicts within the Muslim world (for example, Israel–Palestine, Libya,
Syria and Iraq). Richard English (2009) wisely argues that military responses can
backfire and generate the very terrorism that they seek to combat: the increase in
terrorism and violence both within and beyond21 Iraq is a notable example (English
2015). Donald Dannreuther (2007) further posits that the war in Iraq directly fed
political rhetoric and served the interests of jihadists who have capitalised on Western
foreign policy’s faux pas by fostering support for their violent causes in European and
Middle Eastern countries. On their side, Islamist terrorists have often exploited the
rhetoric of Western imperialism, rather than using religion qua religion, to justify and
execute spectacular acts of ‘resistance’ (Levi 2007)—elsewhere more properly defined
as ‘terrorism’22 (Schmid 2011).
Since 9/11, these global clashes have occurred in a cultural and more local form—
that is, through the domestic reminders that the West has offered its Muslim citizens
that Muslim diversity is problematic. These reminders have often entailed the
securitisation of Muslims (Kundnani 2014) and have followed a sociopolitical contin-
uum in the shaping of public perceptions of those who, over 15 years ago, were
considered ‘dangerous strangers’ (Zolberg and Woon 1999) and who are now popularly
deemed to be members of a ‘suspect community’ (Pantazis and Pemberton 2009).
Moreover, these reminders have normalised wide-ranging exceptional measures to deal
with Islamist terrorism, in a context in which various studies (Kurzman 2012; LaFree et
al. 2010; Mueller 2006) demonstrate that the terrorist threat, while serious, needs to be
viewed in proportion. In the twenty-first century, Western Europe has been much safer
than in the last 30 years of the twentieth century: the Global Terrorism Database (York
2015) shows that, between 2000 and 2015, terrorist activities resulted in more than 100
casualties per annum only in 2004 (Madrid attack) and in 2015 (Paris attack). This
figure is in stark comparison with the previous 30 years (1970–1999), 23 of which saw
more than 100 casualties every year as a result of violence perpetrated by the Irish
Republican Army in the United Kingdom, the Euskadi Ta Askatasuna in Spain and
other terrorist groups across Europe. Richard English (2015:24) correctly reminds us
Bhow comparatively limited terrorism-generated levels of death and injury actually are
21 Petter Nesser’s (2015) study demonstrates that European involvement in conflicts in the Muslim world, as
well as events considered to be offensive to Islam and the Prophet Muhammad (notably, the Danish cartoons
in 2005) and sustained campaigns by the GIA and al-Qaeda, have historically inspired many terrorist plots
against European countries and interests.
22 Here this term accords with (an extract of) the ‘revised academic consensus definition of terrorism as
Bcalculated, demonstrative, direct violent action without legal or moral restraints, targeting mainly civilians
and non-combatants, performed for its propagandistic and psychological effects on various audiences and
conflict parties^ (Schmid 2011:86).
240 Cont Islam (2016) 10:223–247
when set against more major threats^. In this respect, domestic overreactions to the
threat of terrorism risk delegitimising the state and its political, legal and security
apparatus within Muslim communities, effectively undermining the same institutions
that counter-terrorism efforts should safeguard.
This paper contends that, in Great Britain, global hostilities have sparked cultural
domestic tensions in a context in which Muslims have become Ba national security
concern, the focus of state intervention and political management, and subject to wide-
ranging suspicions around loyalties to the country of residence/citizenship^ (Lynch
2013:257). The British government has responded to the real and perceived threat of
Islamist terrorism by consciously or unconsciously feeding into the symbolism of a
clash of civilisations between its non-Muslim majority and its Muslim minority through
practices broadly aimed at securitising not only violent Islamists and their supporters
but also wider Muslim communities. Net-widening notions and practices of counter-
terrorism, which seek both to reduce risk and uncertainty and to reassert state monopoly
over the distribution (if not always the delivery) of security, have inadvertently
signalled a further cultural distancing between British society and Muslim communi-
ties, with potentially negative consequences for the shaping of a pluralistic yet cohesive
society.
Concluding remarks
The iconography of destruction and death supplied by the terrorist attacks of 9/11
is a powerful image still pervading Western minds: it reinforced the image of the
Orient as a mystical power and undermined the notion that the United States is an
unbeatable superpower (Ibrahim 2007). At the time of writing, the US-led inter-
national coalition is carrying out relentless air strikes in Syria in order to vanquish
the Islamic State, showing the Bcontinuing role of force as a factor in the
calculations and actions of governments^ (Roberts 2012:180). As both the Islamic
State and al-Qaeda reassert the importance of targeting the Western ‘far enemy’, a
key principle of al-Qaeda’s original doctrine (Europol 2015), international military
intervention in the absence of a long-term strategy to stabilise a turbulent Middle
East (Habeck et al. 2015) and to solve the Bsocietal and political failures in Iraq
and Syria^ (Lister 2015:11) risks provoking terrorist retaliation against Western
powers involved in the conflict. Meanwhile, the British net-widening security
approach has fallen into the political trap set up by Islamist terrorists and has
fuelled the rhetoric of a domestic clash of civilisations. Politically naïve preven-
tative approaches will continue both to problematise much-needed mutual engage-
ment with Muslim communities and local authorities and to inform similarly
contested European strategies (Bigo et al. 2015a). Ongoing public concerns that
counter-terrorism legislation and strategies are the consequences of an excessive
state focus on Muslim diversity must be counteracted with more positive narra-
tives and actions. Otherwise, these concerns will both affect community confi-
dence in the security apparatus and undermine the effectiveness of those measures
that directly target violent Islamists and their supporters. Far from ‘civilising
security’ (Loader and Walker 2007) and showing strategic astuteness in its fight
against terrorism, the British state is accidentally playing into the hands of violent
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Islamist recruiters who prey on young Muslims who are culturally alienated,
socially discriminated against and politically disenfranchised.
While this paper has demonstrated some positive aspects of Western–Islamic rela-
tions, ongoing tensions over the practices of inter-ethnic and inter-religious coexis-
tence—for example, as indicated by significant levels of public concern over Muslim
integration in British society (YouGov 2013), a higher threshold for being considered
British and generally negative views of immigration held by one in two Britons (Kiss
and Park 2014)—raise questions regarding the relationship between British society and
cultural diversity. The discrimination of Muslims in Great Britain, the United States and
elsewhere (for example, Australia; see Noble 2005) provide evidence of persistent,
albeit varying, negative Western attitudes towards Islam in a context in which bottom-
up opportunities for positive inter-ethnic contact are seriously needed in order to foster
good inter-community relations (Bekhuis et al. 2013). The twentieth and the twenty-
first centuries may be the most peaceful eras in the history of humankind (Pinker 2011),
yet the march towards social justice and equality in Great Britain, and in the West more
generally, needs to overcome the state ‘security syndrome’ and find ways to cure the
malaise of terrorism and violent extremism without giving up on inter-community
relations, social cohesion and civil liberties.
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